Targeted Inspection in a Local Public Good Experiment

主讲嘉宾  邹心璐

主讲人简介:

邹心璐，东北财经大学金融学院副教授(预聘制)、上海财经大学经济学博士。主要研究方向为行为与实验经济学，行为博弈论等。主持国家自然科学基金项目1项。研究成果发表在Economic Theory、Journal of Economic Behavior &Organization等国际高水平期刊。

论文简介:

This study compares two inspection mechanisms for promoting cooperation in a public goods game. The mechanisms differ in which players are selected for inspection. In a repeated two-stage game, players in each period first choose their network neighbors and then choose their contributions to a local public good that benefits both themselves and their neighbors. The random inspection mechanismselects oneplayer with equal probability, while the targeted inspection mechanisselects only the player with the fewest neighbors. Theoretically, targeted inspection is predicted to be more effective in promoting cooperation because severing links with less cooperative neighbors is an equilibrium strategy, implying that less cooperative players should have fewer neighbors. However, experimental results show that targeted inspection leads to lower cooperation than random inspection. We find that participants under targeted inspection primarily maintain more links to reduce their likelihood of being inspected rather than severing links with less cooperative neighbors

活动时间: 2026年10月15日 星期四 上午9:00-10:30

活动地点: 金融学院会议室(劝学楼345小会议室)

主办单位: 金融学院、实验经济学实验室

欢迎广大教师、博士研究生、硕士研究生参加!