Financially Incentivized Social

Endorsement Improves Market Efficiency

主讲嘉宾

高媚       助理教授      

报告人简介:

高媚，上海外国语大学国际工商管理学院助理教授，毕业于浙江大学经济学院，获金融学博士学位，美国乔治·梅森大学(George Mason University)访问学者，2023年上海市晨光学者。主要研究方向为实验金融、行为金融。目前已经在《管理科学学报》、《证券市场导报》、《南方经济》、Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics、Joural of Behavioral and Experimental Finance、 The North American Journal of Economics and Finance、Frontiers in psychology等国内外权威期刊发表论文数篇。

报告论文简介:

This paper examines how different forms of incentives for posting public commentary affect asset pricing. Results from a learning-to-forecast experiment show that introducing public commentary alone does not affect mispricing. However, prices tend to be higher when we allow endorsement (social incentives). When we provide performance-based financial incentives on commentary, with only the top two comments being paid, overpricing tends to be reduced. Content analyses reveal that endorsement leads to more positive sentiment, increasing overpricing. On the other hand, financial incentives enhance the quality of the public commentary and help participants make wiser predictions, leading to more efficient asset prices.

活动时间:2024年10月18日星期五上午9:30-11:00

活动地点:金融学院会议室 劝学楼345 小会议室

主办单位:金融学院、实验经济学实验室

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