Optimal fiscal policy with Ricardian and hand-to-mouth agents
主讲嘉宾：侯尚迪 助理教授
报告人简介:
侯尚迪，辽宁大学中国经济研究院助理教授，于2023年7月获得西班牙巴塞罗那自治大学（Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona）经济学博士学位。研究方向为宏观经济学，特别是最优货币政策、财政政策的理论研究。曾受邀在德国曼海姆大学、瑞典斯德哥尔摩大学等海内外知名经济院校作学术报告，合作或独作论文正在投递中。
报告论文简介:
We study the optimal fiscal policy in a model with two types of agents who are different in their access to the financial markets: Ricardian agents have full access to the financial markets while the hand-to-mouth agents are constrained and could only consume their labor income in each period. We find that the optimal labor-tax is more volatile compared with a representative-agent economy without physical capital and the volatility is captured by the equilibrium condition that these two types of agents are imposed with the same proportional labor tax. When capital is introduced to this economy, we find that in the long run capital tax should still be zero in the deterministic caseBut the ex-ante capital tax in the stochastic economy is again disturbed by the same proportional labor tax condition, which makes it fluctuate around zero instead of staying there.
活动时间：2024年11月5日 星期二上午9:30-11:00
活动地点：金融学院会议室（劝学楼 345 小会议室）
主办单位：金融学院、实验经济学实验室
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